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Introduction
Those logistic professionals [TALCEs] , they are like the linemen of a football team. They get no recognition, they get no appreciation. But we cannot move without them. 1 
General Gregory Martin, Commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe

Overview
Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, 27 December 2001: As we walked on the dirt road leading from the airfield ramp to the TALCE/MST compound, which was near the control tower, we entered an environment that few experience except in books and in the movies. Some of the images that were indelibly etched into my mind include the nearly overpowering darkness, the outlines of dead trees devoid of any vegetation, the piles of twisted metal and other wreckage from years of war, the piles of dirt and lack of grass, and the bomb and bullet scarred buildings, especially the control tower next to which our compound was located and would soon grow. It reminded me of the scenes from the HBO min-series "Band of Brothers" as U.S. soldiers entered devastated French towns on their trek towards Germany.
College has given it limited attention also, offering one elective course and hosting a visit by the commander of U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).
One does not have to look further than the evening news to see the impact of the shortage of air mobility assets in the war on terrorism. With the on going operations in Afghanistan, the massive deployment towards Iraq which increases daily, anti-terrorist operations in Yemen and the Philippines, and an emerging nuclear crisis with North Korea, air mobility units are stretched very thin. At first it appears impressive that the United States can be engaged in all these theaters simultaneously, but a discerning look reveals serious concerns. These include the predicted length of deployments to Southwest Asia, the cancellation of the President's trip to Africa in February which would have required large numbers of C-17s and C-5s, both of which are in short supply, and the use of sealift to move military equipment and supplies to Southwest Asia over the last several months to compensate for the shortfall in airlift.
Clearly, air mobility is an essential part of the transformation of airpower, and it involves much more than expensive aircraft and highly trained aircrews. As important are the en route and forward operating bases and the ability to quickly establish those bases. This capability is called Global Reach Laydown (GRL) and is the subject of this paper.
Thesis
The thesis of this paper is that the employment of GRL units has improved from DESERT SHIELD through ALLIED FORCE and ENDURING FREEDOM, but more improvements need to be made. Unfortunately, many in the USAF do not fully understand the importance of GRL, including some in Air Mobility Command which trains and deploys these units. The air mobility-intensive contingency in Afghanistan and other recent crises have illustrated the need for military and political leaders to pay much more attention to all aspects of rapid global mobility, including the little known units called Tanker Airlift Control Elements (TALCEs) and the Contingency Response Group (CRG) which constitute the bulk of GRL units.
Key Terms and History of GRL
In 1994, under the leadership of General Ronald R. Fogleman, then the Commander of Air Mobility Command (AMC) and Commander in Chief of US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), a white paper was written entitled "In Support of Global Reach." 5 This paper explained how AMC would redefine, restructure, and operate an air mobilty system that would be more responsive to the post-Cold War era. A key tenant of this new strategy was the ability to rapidly expand and/or establish the worldwide en route system through a Global Reach Laydown (GRL) strategy. 6 This White Paper defined this GRL strategy as the ability to "rapidly establish AMC presence and infrastructure where none existed or to expand the fixed portion of the en route system to support increased air mobility operations." 7 To support units that would deploy to establish the en route and forward operation locations (FOLs) to support this GRL strategy, AMC created Air Mobility Operations Groups (AMOGs). 8 The two AMOGs today include the 621 st AMOG at McGuire AFB in New Jersey, and the 615 th AMOG at Travis AFB in California. AMOGs train and equip forces that comprise the mobile GRL units termed Tanker Airlift Control Elements (TACLEs). The term "TALCE"
was created in 1994 when the AMOGs were established. 9 A Mission Support Team (MST) is a smaller TALCE which is led by a non-commissioned officer and has the same mission as a TALCE but on a smaller scale. 10 TALCEs were formerly known as Airlift Control Elements (ALCEs) which had been in existence for years. During the Vietnam War, numerous ALCEs were deployed throughout Southeast Asia. 11 The basic organization and concept of operations of today's TALCEs began to take shape just after Vietnam, when the C-130s were sent to Military Airlift Command (MAC) in 1975. 12 These ALCEs were tasked to support airlift at locations where support was either very limited or nonexistent. The ALCEs would also train users from all four services on how to get the most out of the airlift system during peace and war.
The mission of the TALCEs is to establish air mobility operations in all types of environments, from modern airports to the most austere combat zones. They provide three basic functions: command and control, aerial port, and aircraft maintenance, but additional functions can be added as needed including security forces, medical, finance and contracting, public affairs, translators, and many others. 13 TALCEs have a twelve hour response time, which means once they get a deployment order, they must begin loading onto aircraft just twelve hours later.
A 15 The 86 th CRG was created in 1999 and replaced the USAFE TALCE which was also located at Ramstein AB. 16 Like the AMOG TALCEs, the CRG provides aerial port, C2, and aircraft maintenance, but unlike the AMOG TALCEs it has permanently assigned security and medical forces for even faster response and greater team integrity. 17 CRGs use substantially less airlift than TALCEs do, usually thirteen C-130s to deploy sixty personnel and their equipment into a bare base environment.
18
One quickly realizes the crucial importance of GRL when it is linked to the broader concepts of Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF) and the Global Mobility Task Force (GMTF)
Concept of Operations (CONOPS). General Jumper's manic push to make the USAF into a truly expeditionary force, termed AEF, has made mobility forces even more important.
Ironically, as of this writing the USAF has only 45 C-17s available on a daily basis while it pushes ahead for the next two generations of fighter aircraft.
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Helping to focus the AEF- 25 ALCEs/TALCEs were also used in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and during many disaster assistance operations. The TALCE concept seems tailor made to support today's EAF.
AEFs are required to deploy and place "bombs on target" just 48-hours after receiving an execution order. 26 However, current logistics processes are unable to support this aggressive timeline, and a recent RAND study suggested that global infrastructure preparation is "a central function of planning expeditionary support." 27 This study recommended prepositioning support as far forward as possible to greatly help in meeting this timeline, and discussed the need to field numerous FOLs to "provide a range of employment time lines for operational use." 28 Ironically, this study never mentioned anything about TALCEs or the CRG which operate at FOLs and are a key to rapid global mobility. The overall conclusion of that thesis was that strategic airlift inefficiencies improved during these contingencies, but that more remained to be accomplished, especially in educating users on how to get the most out of the air mobility system. 33 Because GRL was only a small part of the original model of strategic airlift inefficiency, a modified model is used for this analysis. This GRL model will examine the following aspects of the use of ALCEs, TALCEs, and CRGs during Operations ALLIED FORCE and ENDURING FREEDOM using DESERT SHIELD as a baseline: availability of bases both en route and in theater, communications, supply, training and readiness of GRL personnel, command relationships, education of users, and total force integration. These variables are defined as follows:
• Availability of bases: Were there adequate numbers of en route and forward operating bases (FOBs)?
34
• Communications: Were adequate communications available at GRL locations, including voice and data including secure communications, ITV, and the Global Decision Support System (GDSS)?
• Supply: Were GRL units adequately supplied? This variable includes Material Handling Equipment (MHE).
• Training and Readiness of personnel: Were personnel adequately trained for the demanding GRL mission? This includes training in primary career field and the ability to operate in an austere, medium threat environment.
• Education of users: Were the primary users (or customers to use a now out of favor Total Quality Management term) familiar with GRL units prior to working with them on that particular deployment?
• Command relations: Was the chain of command clear and effective? Were there problems determining the "ownership" of GRL units?
• Total Force integration: Were guard and reserve personnel effectively utilized?
• 
DESERT SHIELD
In the main, this unprecedented airlift operation was very successful. Yet by many measures the strategic airlift system did not appear to attain its expected performance level. 1 
Project Air Force Analysis of the Air War in the Gulf
Overview
The Gulf War airlift remains to this day the largest airlift in history, making the Berlin airlift pale in comparison. In fact, during DESERT SHIELD and continuing through DESERT STORM, Military Airlift Command (MAC) moved ten times the daily ton-miles of the Berlin Airlift. 2 The Gulf War marked the first major strategic deployment of combat units by air, and the rapid deployment of these units helped keep the Iraqis from threatening other nations, especially Saudi Arabia. 3 But while this airlift was successful, there were numerous problems which prevented all forces from closing on time for the start of DESERT STORM. This airlift was successful despite major shortcomings because of "a superb resource base plus five and onehalf months to prepare." Additional ALCEs were soon deployed to Riyadh, Cairo, King Fahd, Oman, and other locations. 6 They all experienced various problems as the GRL model now explains.
The GRL model
There was an insufficient number of bases supporting this airlift, both in Europe and in the AOR. Throughout DESERT SHIELD, eighty-four percent of MAC's strategic airlift missions transited just four European bases. 7 The situation in the AOR was worse. Even though the U.S.
had spent considerable funds on expanding and improving several airfields in Southwest Asia, many infrastructure improvements were needed including additional ramp space and fuel hydrants. 8 Dhahran handled fifty-nine percent of the strategic lift missions, Riyadh handled eight percent, Jubail eight percent, and various other airfields the rest. 9 With few bases, the airlift system quickly became clogged. Lieutenant General Kondra, the AMC Director of
Operations during this airlift, summarized this situation:
We had a four foot opening trying to push airlift through that 7,000 mile long hose and come out a 4" nozzle at the other end. It doesn't work very well. You've got to have the offload bases to handle what you're putting into that flow. 10 It took almost two months to get additional bases in the AOR, and users took over three months to begin using locations other than Dhahran.
11
Communications were overwhelmed during DESERT SHIELD. MAC command, control, and communications were so poor that it was characterized as "essentially useless," causing the deployment to be "anything but well executed." 12 The Global Decision Support System (GDSS), the main MAC C2 system at the time, was typically eighteen hours behind schedule, and therefore became by default an "after action reporting system" rather than an execution system. 13 In-transit Visibility (ITV), which is "the ability to track the identity, status, and location of DOD unit and non-unit cargo and passengers, medical patients and personal property from origin to destination during peace, contingencies, and war", was poor. 14 Incorrectly marked pallets, no common data base, and excessive classification of loads resulted in two football field's worth of undeliverable cargo at one location in Southwest Asia. 15 There was a shortage of secure telephones called "STU-IIIs" and computerized flight plans for aircrews were often not available because many ALCEs did not have the equipment to receive them. 16 27 Because GRL units have a requirement to begin deploying in just hours, the initial ALCE units that deployed were almost exclusively active duty personnel.
Summary
The biggest airlift in history thus serves as a model to compare subsequent contingencies that used GRL assets. In most measures of the GRL analytical model, ACLEs during DESERT SHIELD suffered from significant problems including a shortage of bases to establish airlift operations, communications, supply, training and readiness, command relations, education of users, and total force integration. These shortfalls "prevented optimal performance of the airlift system." 28 Ironically the resulting inefficiencies were not severe enough to prevent the airlift system from accomplishing its overall mission. As General Schwarzkopf stated:
Operation DESERT SHIELD was the fastest build up and movement of combat power across greater distances in less time than at any other time in history. It was an absolutely gigantic accomplishment, and I can't give credit enough to the logisticians and transporters who were able to pull this off. 29 However, in an ominous foreshadowing of the state of the air mobility system today, the 27 Lund, 30-31. 28 Ibid, xiii. 29 Ibid, 45. 30 Ibid, 45. In preparation for deployment, USAFE conducted site surveys of twenty-seven locations in eleven NATO and Eastern European countries. 11 These site surveys allowed logistics planners to adjust deployment timelines and reduce airlift requirements. 12 However, according to a RAND study, "political and policy barriers slowed the site survey and bed down processes, and necessary site preparation activities at bare bases further delayed deployments." 13 Other problems that delayed the deployment of GRL units included changes in host nation support, use of site survey checklists designed for deliberate planning instead of crisis action planning, and delays obtaining timely diplomatic clearances for site survey teams which subsequently slowed the deployment of GRL assets. In fact, their capability was so impressive that many other units deployed to Tirana, including numerous allied forces, used these assets to the point of over-saturation. The TALCE that was deployed to Tirana to support TASK FORCE HAWK was similarly well equipped with communications. GDSS worked well for the CRG, but it suffered from out of date schedules.
Chapter 3 ALLIED FORCE
In addition, NATO and other foreign aircraft were not tracked, causing the CRG to implement a first in -first out priority system, certainly not ideal for an efficient operation.
22
The supply system for GRL units did not show significant improvement since DESERT SHIELD. A RAND study concluded that overall, the supply distribution system was "insufficient to support FOLs…" 23 The CRG at Tirana often found itself at the bottom of the supply priority system, with no central theater authority assigning specific priorities to individual items needed "downrange." 24 One example was their urgent need for Hesco Bastion force protection barriers. The 86 th CRG was located less than sixty miles from the Kosovo border, making them the most forward deployed ground force in the AOR, and they fully expected and prepared for an attack. 25 Ironically, charcoal for TASK FORCE HAWK units' cookouts arrived before CRG Hesco bastions arrived! 26 However, one good news story was MHE. There were no significant problems with MHE in theater, unlike DESERT SHIELD.
Effective training and readiness of GRL personnel paid big dividends. When the CRG was deployed for ALLIED FORCE, they had only been activated three weeks before and were at sixty percent strength. 27 At Tirana, trained aerial porters, maintainers, and communications specialists all performed safely and effectively. 28 Public affairs and OPSEC training were heavily utilized as Tirana became a media hub. 29 Additional in-country training included primary career field such as aerial port, maintenance, and command and control, and also the ability to operate in an austere, medium threat environment. However, because the CRG was activated just prior to this deployment, much training had yet to be accomplished. However, the CRG did not utilize any ARC personnel because none were ever assigned to it.
41
Summary GRL units, primarily the 86 th CRG and the 621 st TALCE, both deployed to Tirana, Albania, performed exceptionally well despite many continuing challenges identified from DESERT SHIELD. ALLIED FORCE was a great success due in part to the ability to rapidly deploy units into an austere theater and to support those units. However, deployment timelines were much longer than required and proved that the USAF still needed to make major improvements. As the RAND report on ALLIED FORCE concluded and accurately predicted, "The CONUS-heavy basing structure combined with the need to rapidly deploy forces present significant support and deployment challenges." 42 Two years later during ENDURING FREEDOM, some of these problems were still a thorn in the side of the GRL community. 25 Ibid, 8-9. 26 Ibid, 23. 27 Ibid, 3. 28 Ibid, 1-3. 29 airfield that had over one-hundred wrecked aircraft and facilities that were in poor condition. 7 He discovered the invaluable help the US embassy staff provided in dealing with the airport and local staffs, but it was two months before any force structure arrived.
TALCEs that deployed to Bagram AB and Kandahar, Afghanistan, deployed into a war zone. Entirely self supportive, they brought everything they needed and operated for over two months at each location, with additional support provided by the US Army. 8 These conditions
were much worse than Manas where CRG personnel initially stayed in hotels downtown and force protection was less of a concern. The experiences of the TALCEs and CRG during ENDURING FREEDOM point out the continuing need to hone skills such as joint, multinational, and interagency operations. The CRG's use of a "Coalition Forces Coordinator"
to assist allied forces working with them is an example of the changing nature of GRL deployments.
9
Communications continued to improve during these deployments, making significant advances from the Gulf War. ITV was more effective along with GDSS. 10 However, not all missions were in GDSS, and the CRG would simply call the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) at Scott AFB IL to get updates. 11 The biggest shortfall the TALCEs experienced was a shortage of Iridium phones.
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At Kandahar, the TALCE discovered that it did not have interoperable communications with the US Marines stationed there, and coordination of flight times was difficult. 13 The CRG did not deploy with SATCOM radios that had data capability.
14 This forced them to read their daily Situation Reports (SITREPS) using secure voice to C2 agencies, which was a time-consuming and awkward process. 15 What was impressive was that at
Bagram and Kadahar the US Army provided SIPRNET to both TALCEs within weeks after the TALCEs arrived.
Ironically, the TACC would often call TALCEs at Kandahar and Bagram for departure information. 16 Technically, the TACC should have been getting this from the AMD via GDSS, but when the TACC was often asked about this their reply was, "Their phones are always busy!"
It is ironic that hundreds of millions of dollars in Information Technology (IT) investment by TRANSCOM since the Gulf War stills results in DSN telephone calls over unsecure lines in a war zone! Supply problems continued for both TALCEs and CRGs. Over 1,305 short tons of TALCE support equipment was deployed, including aircraft maintenance packages, MHE, communication suites, ITV support, and other items. 17 However, resupply of TALCEs was problematic. It was common for supply requests to take weeks to be filled, and often TACLEs in Afghanistan would send two airmen with a Form 9 to Seeb, Oman, to purchase TALCE-specific items. 18 One serious problem GRL units experienced was the inability to get Environmental Control Units (ECUs) at Kandahar. These units eventually arrived, but late. They were mission essential because the extreme heat made it nearly impossible to get adequate sleep in tents as early as March. 19 At Manas, the CRG's aircraft maintenance flight had almost no parts or follow-on equipment to work the airflow.
20
In addition, they had trouble getting the correct Aircraft Ground Equipment (AGE), rolling stock, and other equipment to maintain their workload.
21
It took almost two months for the CRG to get everything they needed to begin airfield operations.
According to General Kelly, this delay was a combination of three factors: the air flow was horrible and very unpredictable because of the C-5's maintenance reliability, the weather was horrendous, and the CRG was low on the CENTCOM priority list. Another essential aspect of AMOG training was monthly training sessions that took one hour and consisted of guest speakers who were subject matter experts. Termed Air Mobility InHouse Exercises (AMEXes), they were created from the 821 st AMS' innovative idea program.
The first AMEX involved casualty notification and assistance and was conducted eighteen months before the TALCEs deployed to Afghanistan. The casualty notification officer from
McGuire and the squadron chaplain both participated and led discussions including the composition of the notifying party, the duties of a family liaison officer, and how to plan and conduct a memorial service. Other AMEXes included finance and contracting, public health, media training (which came in handy more than ever imagined), Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD), force protection, family support, legal, and many others. This training was very similar to that conducted by the CRG.
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But a unique training need not planned for was discovered at Manas and bodes for future GRL emphasis. As General Kelly and the CRG began assessing the airfield, they realized they needed in depth civil engineering experience and contracting expertise. 24 Fortunately, the CRG received a Contingency Real Estate Team (CREST) from the Army Corps of Engineers twenty days into their deployment. They are experts at land assessment, value and negotiation and are authorized contracting agents for the US government. 25 Traditional USAF civil engineers build airfields and supporting structures but do not acquire land or lease work areas, and the CREST team was invaluable in acquiring the land and buildings at Manas that the CRG required. 26 Education of users continued to be a concern during OEF. Many people still don't know what the TALCE community does, including some officers in AMC. The TALCEs in
Afghanistan briefed more than one Army 0-6 in the 10 th Mountain Division and 101 st --some of the most mobile divisions in the US Army--on what TALCEs are, because they didn't know before they worked with the TALCEs. 27 With the enormous emphasis that the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, has placed on making the Army more agile and mobile, this was hard to believe! Command relations were not a significant problem during this contingency. At Kandahar, the USMC commander initially believed he owned the TALCE, but this issue was eventually resolved. 28 An Air Mobility Operations Squadron (AMOS) from the 621 st AMOG at
McGuire was deployed to PSAB just days after 9/11, and this unit managed the GRL assets within the AOR. The chain of command was clear: TALCE and MST units in the AOR were COCOM to TRANSCOM via the AMD at PSAB; the 86 th CRG was placed under the control of CENTCOM instead of EUCOM. 29 However, the problem with command relations developed as
TALCEs and CRG began to redeploy and to be replaced by Air Expeditionary Groups (AEGs).
CENTAF was responsible for sourcing these AEGs, and coordination with AMC and USAFE for these replacements was very poor, with TALCEs remaining deployed much longer than the 30-60 days they were designed for. 30 CENTAF demanded that the GRL units leave their equipment in place for use by the AEGs; this would have crippled the TALCEs' and CRG's ability to reconstitute. After much "haggling," both GRL units eventually left with their equipment. 31 This problem is clearly related to educating users about GRL capability and limitations.
Although many reserve and guard personnel were utilized by the TALCEs during OEF, most of these were security forces personnel. Two-thirds of the USAF TALCE capability is in the ARC, but only a small percentage was mobilized for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
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The back-to-back deployments the active duty TALCEs experienced to the Persian Gulf and then Afghanistan were demanding, and clearly the ARC TALCEs could have provided some relief. maintainers, and 67% of the command and control, the ARC could be much more effective in the TALCE world only if they were reorganized as traditional TALCEs. 33 Perhaps their lack of participation in ENDURING FREEDOM despite their tremendous capabilities and well trained and well led personnel will finally force HQ AMC to consider this proposed reorganization.
Summary
GRL units during OEF continued to accomplish their missions effectively, despite operating in the most austere and dangerous environment any GRL assets had operated in since
Vietnam. While our model shows much improvement since the Gulf War, problems remained, especially in areas of supply, communications, education of users, and use of the ARC.
The war in Afghanistan was significant also because it reversed the usual transportation mode for logistics. Usually, in a contingency this size, ninety percent or more is moved via sealift; in Afghanistan ninety-five percent was moved via air. 34 As the operation matured, however, more was being moved via sea and land, although by the end of July 2002 seventy-two percent was still being moved via airlift. 
Overview
A common human foible is to take for granted something which always seems to work and then to become complacent about that item. Repeated problems with that item become "manageable" because they don't appear to effect outcomes. Resolving those problems is then delayed, pushed to another day for others to deal with. The repeated success of TALCEs and the CRG during many demanding missions on recent contingencies illustrates this. Despite challenges with base availability and the condition of those bases, communications, supply, training, command relations, user familiarity with the GRL mission, and varying levels of total force integration, TALCEs and the 86 th CRG accomplished their missions effectively, safely, and professionally in some of the most harsh and forbidding environments any military forces have deployed into in decades. It is my belief that more attention needs to be given to GRL units so they can continue meeting future challenges.
Conclusion
The evolution of these GRL problems for DESERT SHIELD, ALLIED FORCE, and Base availability has always been challenging and will continue to be so in future contingencies. While diplomatic efforts negotiate basing rights, it is imperative for GRL units to have the highest state of readiness and to lean forward in preparation for the inevitable and sudden "green light" to deploy. And they must continue to be ready to operate in austere, hostile environments, bringing all their support with them. But they must also be prepared for joint, multinational, and interagency operations. The combined experiences of the 86 th CRG at Manas and the TACLEs in Afghanistan should be the planning factor for future worst case scenarios, and training should be geared accordingly.
Problems with communications have been mitigated, but GRL units need to have a higher priority in receiving the latest equipment. The CRG did not have all the radios they required at
Manas because it was last on the USAFE priority list for these radios. 3 And TALCEs deployed during OEF suffered from a shortage of Iridium radios. However, ITV, GDSS, and general communications equipment showed major improvements over the course of these three contingencies, although problems remain.
One of the biggest problems remaining is adequately supplying GRL units once they are deployed. TALCEs and the CRG suffered from general resupply problems throughout all three operations, from force protection items to ECUs. With the enormous emphasis on agile combat support in our expeditionary Air Force, this is inexcusable. More needs to be done in this area.
Training and readiness of GRL personnel is effective, but the need for additional expertise was identified during OEF. Coalition Coordination Officers, CREST personnel, CE expertise, experience dealing with embassies, and other skills can be expected to be in big demand on future deployments and must be integrated into GRL training. The ability to perform one's primary career field in an austere, medium threat environment with many diverse players will also continue to drive intense training in garrison. Public affairs training along with force protection, public health, and other specialized training will continue to be mandatory.
Command relations and education of users continue to be challenges. Although the publicity TALCEs and the CRG received from many high-visibility deployments during OEF have been helpful, more work in these areas need to be done. And the biggest weak area for GRL throughout these three contingencies has been effectively integrating the ARC. With two-thirds of TALCE capability in the ARC and so little of it used during OEF, active duty GRL assets are being burned out. This must change, for both operational and equity reasons.
Recommendations
Because GRL personnel accomplished their many demanding missions throughout the world in the last thirteen years so effectively despite facing many recurring problems, one could easily conclude that exceptionally well trained personnel can handle by themselves continuing shortfalls. It is my belief that only by actively pursuing the following recommendations will GRL units be in the strongest position to meet the unexpected and inevitable challenges on future operations:
• Users must be better educated about the capabilities and limitations of GRL units. AMC should re-look the affiliation program which heavily involves the AMOGs. The affiliation program teaches thousands of students a year from all four services on how users can get the most out of the air mobility system. Also, it should be a requirement that all newly selected flag officers from all the services visit an AMOG or the 86 th CRG and see what they do. It would be to their self interest, because the success of a deployment they might lead someday could depend on their knowledge of GRL.
Recurring problems with GRL command relations might also be mitigated with better education of senior officers.
• AMC must support GRL units much better. From providing adequate supplies and communications, to supporting the AMOG and CRG concepts, AMC must no longer take for granted its GRL units but rather focus on finally resolving these problems and positioning them to meet future demands.
o Eighteen months before they deployed into Afghanistan, a senior officer at AMC made a comment at a transportation conference to the effect that "he didn't know exactly what the AMOGs do, but we need those aerial porters and maintainers back on the flight lines." This comment is a perfect example of someone being "military history challenged," because hundreds of years of western military experience clearly show that units that train effectively in peacetime will perform much better in wartime than those units that are "thrown together" at the last minute. In his book Citizen Soldiers, Stephen Ambrose describes how individual replacements were sent to U.S. units in Western Europe during WWII, and how they often didn't survive the first few days at the front. 4 The same goes for GRL units-you can not patch together command and control from one base, aerial port from another, and maintenance from a third and hope to have an effective unit hours later, especially in a combat zone.
o To help resolve recurring supply problems, GRL units should specify on their daily SITREPs not only what they require, but when, and they should also specify a MAJCOM OPR to assist the deployed AMD. The AMD at PSAB was overwhelmed during OEF with supply requests, and clearly needed a better "reach-back" capability to AMC.
• There must be better crosstell among GRL units, not only within the USAF, but with our allies, sister services, US government agencies and international organizations. The
American way of war can now be summarized as joint/multinational/interagency/ total force operations. In order to gather ideas from other GRL units, to better coordinate procedures, and to pave the way for effective and efficient contingenices, TRANSCOM and AMC should host an annual GRL conference. Invited units should include the CRG, AMOGs, and similar units from the sister Services, ARC, and allied nations. Much could be learned from these conferences. In addition, this paper supports the current AMC initiative to rename AMOGs "CRGs." This will help standardize equipment and procedures and allow users to more easily understand GRL missions and capabilities.
• AMC should improve its trend analysis of GRL deployments. While there are many after action reports from TALCEs and the CRG, no organization has compared GRL lessons learned between different contingencies. It is inexcusable for some of the problems identified in the GRL model presented in this paper to exist for thirteen years! If more comparative analysis is accomplished, perhaps these problems will finally be resolved.
Also, the nature of military transformation deems that this should be done.
• To be more effective, the ARC TACLEs should be reorganized as complete TALCEs similar to their active duty counterparts with C2, aerial port, and maintenance all in one unit. If this is done, the ARC TALCEs may be used for more than simply augmenting command posts, as stage managers, and as individual replacements.
Final Comments
The author of this paper had the unique privilege of interacting with ALCEs as a C-141 !" 5 Our airmen at the front have done their jobs. We owe it to them to implement the recommendations of this paper. As the next battle in the war on terrorism looms, time is of the essence.
Notes
